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Abstract
International surveys reveal wide differences between the views held in different countries
concerning the causes of wealth or poverty and the extent to which people are responsible for
their own fate. At the same time, social ethnographies and experiments by psychologists demon-
strate individuals’ recurrent struggle with cognitive dissonance as they seek to maintain, and
pass on to their children, a view of the world where effort ultimately pays off and everyone
gets their just deserts. This paper offers a model that helps explain: i) why most people feel
such a need to believe in a “just world”; ii) why this need, and therefore the prevalence of the
belief, varies considerably across countries; iii) the implications of this phenomenon for interna-
tional differences in political ideology, levels of redistribution, labor supply, aggregate income,
and popular perceptions of the poor. The model shows in particular how complementarities
arise endogenously between individuals’ desired beliefs or ideological choices, resulting in two
equilibria. A first, “American” equilibrium is characterized by a high prevalence of just-world
beliefs among the population and relatively laissez-faire policies. The other, “European” equi-
librium is characterized by more pessimism about the role of effort in economic outcomes and
a more extensive welfare state. More generally, the paper develops a theory of collective beliefs
and motivated cognitions, including those concerning “money” (consumption) and happiness,
as well as religion.
Keywords: ideology, cognitive dissonance, inequality, welfare state, social mobility, religion,
consumerism, self-control, willpower, memory, happiness, psychology.
JEL Classification: D31, D72, D80, E62, P16, Z12.
“Individuals have a need to believe that they live in a world where people generally get what they
deserve.” M. Lerner, The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion, [1982].
Introduction
International surveys reveal striking differences between the views held in different countries
concerning the causes of wealth and poverty, the extent to which individuals are responsible
for their own fate, and the long-run rewards to personal effort. American “exceptionalism,” as
manifested by the widely held belief in the American Dream, is but the most striking example
of this phenomenon. At the same time, ethnographic studies of the working and middle classes
reveal that people do not come to these views as dispassionate statisticians. On the contrary,
they constantly struggle with the cognitive dissonance required to maintain and pass on to their
children the view that hard work and good deeds will ultimately bring a better life, that crime
does not pay, etc., in spite of signals that life may not be that fair. Psychologists have similarly
documented the fact that most individuals feel a strong need to believe that they live in a world
that is just, in the sense that people generally get what they deserve, and deserve what they get.
When confronted with data that conflicts with this view they try to ignore, reinterpret, distort,
or forget it —for instance by finding imaginary merits to the recipients of fortuitous rewards, or
assigning blame to innocent victims.
This paper proposes a theory of why people may feel such a need to believe in a just world; of
why this need, and therefore the prevalence of the belief, may vary considerably across countries;
and of its implications for redistributive policies and the stigma borne by the poor.
The model works as follows. Because of imperfect willpower, people continually strive to
motivate themselves (or their children) toward effort, educational investment, perseverance in
the face of adversity and away from the slippery slope of idleness, welfare dependency, drugs,
etc. In such circumstances, maintaining somewhat rosy beliefs about the fact that everyone
will ultimately get their “just deserts” can be very valuable. If enough people thus end up
with the view that economic success is highly dependent on effort they will represent a pivotal
voting bloc, and set a low tax rate. Conversely, when people anticipate little redistribution,
the value of a proper motivation is much higher than with a generous safety net and high
taxes. Everyone thus has greater incentives to believe in self-sufficiency, and consequently more
voters end up with such a world-view. Due to these complementarities between individuals’
ideological choices, there can be two equilibria. A first, “American” equilibrium is characterized
by a high prevalence of just-world beliefs and a relatively laissez-faire public policy. The other,
“European” equilibrium is characterized by more pessimism and a more extensive welfare state.
Agents are also less likely to blame poverty on a lack of effort or willpower, but aggregate effort
and income are lower than in the first equilibrium.
More generally, this paper proposes a mechanism for the emergence and persistence of collec-
tive beliefs and ideologies. Three other main applications are thus developed. The first concerns
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Figure I: Beliefs and Policies (source: Alesina, Glaser and Sacerdote (2001))
perceptions of the link between “money and happiness” and the related dichotomy observed
between consumerist and leisurist societies. The second is the affective (anxiety-reducing) di-
mension of just-world beliefs, which can play a similar role to that of the functional, motivation-
related one. The third is religion, that is, beliefs about the likelihood of an afterlife and the
nature of its rewards and punishments.
I Self-reliance and redistribution
The extent of direct and indirect redistribution —through taxes and transfers, social insurance,
education finance and labor market regulation— differs remarkably across advanced democracies,
as epitomized by the contrast between the United States and Europe. While there are potential
explanations for this puzzle that do not involve differences in beliefs about the causes of wealth
and poverty (e.g., Bénabou [2000], Alesina and Glaeser [2004]), considerable evidence suggests
that citizens’ views on the role of self-reliance versus societal factors do play a major role.1
1. Importance of beliefs. Data from the World Values Survey [Alesina et al., 2001; Keely,
1Models stressing the role of beliefs about social mobility include Hirschman and Rothschild [1973], Piketty
[1995, 1998], Bénabou and Ok [2001], Rotemberg [2002] and Alesina and Angeletos [2005]. An alternative class
of theories emphasizes how welfare states and laissez-faire societies can arise as multiple steady-states from the
joint dynamics of the wealth distribution and redistributive policies [Bénabou, 2000, 2005; Saint-Paul, 2001;
Hassler et al., 2002; Desdoigts and Moizeau, 2005]. A third line of explanation points to differences in political
institutions, such as a centralized versus a federal state, or in more exogenous national factors, particularly ethnic
heterogeneity; see Alesina et al. [2001] and Alesina and Glaeser [2004] for comprehensive overviews.
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2002] show that only 29 percent of Americans believe that the poor are trapped in poverty and
only 30 percent that luck, rather than effort or education, determines income. The figures for
Europeans are nearly double: 60 percent and 54 percent respectively. Similarly, Americans are
about twice as likely as Europeans to think that the poor “are lazy or lack willpower” (60 percent
versus 26 percent) and that “in the long run, hard work usually brings a better life” (59 percent
versus 34-43 percent, Ladd and Bowman [1998]). Large disparities in attitudes also exist within
Europe, especially between OECD and Eastern European countries [Suhrcke 2001].
Such massive differences cannot be ignored, especially since there is a strong correlation
between these beliefs and actual levels of redistribution: see Figure I, reproduced from Alesina et
al. [2001]. The standard interpretation is one where popular beliefs determine policy outcomes,
and indeed it is the case that individual voters’ perceptions of the extent to which people control
their own fate are major determinants of their attitudes toward inequality and redistribution
—swamping in particular the effects of own income and education (e.g., Fong [2001]). But it
may also be that the nature of the social contract shapes people’s beliefs, and our model in fact
emphasizes that causality runs in both directions.
2. Inaccuracy of beliefs. It should next noted that these popular perceptions are often
distinctly at odds with reality. For instance, there is a significant discrepancy between the wide-
spread view of the United States as an exceptionally mobile society (especially in the minds
of Americans themselves) and the actual evidence on intergenerational income or educational
mobility, which, on average, shows no significant difference with European welfare states.2 Sim-
ilarly, it defies plausibility that the American poor should be intrinsically lazier than their
European counterparts. And indeed, Alesina and Glaeser [2004] show that the hours worked by
the bottom quintile are very comparable on both sides of the Atlantic, and more generally that
there is no relationship across countries between the difference in hours worked by the top and
bottom quintiles and national perceptions of the laziness of the poor.
Theories of how people come to hold divergent beliefs about the roles of luck and effort in
life fall into three categories: “horizontal,” “top-down” and “bottom-up.” The first view is one
of costly learning, as proposed by Piketty [1995]. When finding out about the mobility process
requires experimenting with different levels of effort, individuals (or nations) will eventually stop
doing so (the “bandit problem”) and may thus settle on incorrect beliefs in a purely involun-
tary, accidental manner. The second view has its roots in the Marxist tradition, according to
which workers, especially in America, hold a “false consciousness” about the fairness of market
rewards and the prospects of improving their lot through effort, having been brainwashed by the
propaganda of capitalists who control education, the media, etc. A modern and more symmetric
version of this view is represented by Alesina and Glaeser [2004], who argue that just as American
2Some rank somewhat below the United States (cf. Rustichini et al. [1999] on Italy), others quite similarly
(cf. Lefranc and Trannoy [2004] on France), others yet above (cf. Björklund and Jäntti [1997a,b] on Scandinavian
countries or Couch and Dunn [1997] on Germany).
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beliefs result from indoctrination predominantly controlled by the wealthier classes, European
beliefs result from indoctrination predominantly controlled by Marxist-influenced unions, teach-
ers and politicians. The third view, which is the one we explore, is that individuals’ beliefs are
(consciously or not) shaped as much by their own functional goals and psychological needs as
by actual data: to a certain extent, people believe what they want to believe.
We shall come back to the comparison between the last two approaches in Section IV.
Indeed, our model can be reinterpreted as formalizing people’s receptivity to competing sources
of political indoctrination, making it a natural complement to models that emphasize the supply
side of propaganda (e.g., Glaeser [2006]), but also implying that the “top down” and “bottom
up” views are not easily distinguished on the basis of cross-country correlations. We turn now
to some of the ethnographic and experimental evidence which, together with the statistical facts
on beliefs and redistribution, motivates our approach.
3. Motivated beliefs. Sociologists and political scientists such as Lane [1959], Hochschild
[1981, 1995] and Lamont [2000] conducted hundreds of detailed interviews of working- and
middle-class individuals (both White and Black), exploring in particular their views on economic
success, poverty, and redistribution. The first key finding that consistently emerges from this
research is a form of “false consciousness” that is chosen and valued by the workers themselves
—much like a religion. They obstinately cling to a belief that effort, hard work, good deeds will
ultimately pay off: people get what they deserve, and conversely, what they get, they must
deserve (good or bad). At the same time, they face daily reminders that the world is not so
just, and constantly struggle with the resulting “cognitive dissonance”. Typical of many is this
statement by Maria, a poor cleaning lady interviewed by Hochschild [1981]:
“Once, Maria wonders if executives deserve their $60,000 annual salary: «I don’t think they
do all that [much] work, do you? Sit at their desk —they got it easy». But she suppresses the
thought immediately. «Well, maybe it is a lot of work. Maybe they have a lot of writing to do,
or they have to make sure things go right. So maybe they are deserving of it”».
This type of cognitive conflict and belief manipulation also has an important intergenera-
tional aspect, and both are found at all income and educations levels:
“My mom always told me that hard work, loyalty and respect for others will bring me success,
wrote J. K., who was let go from Credit Suisse in late October. That’s why I came back to CSFB
after business school... and did all that other stuff. Apparently, it doesn’t always work that way.”
(New York Times, December 1st, [2002]).
The second key finding of the ethnographic research on the working class is the overarching
importance of willpower —what Lamont [2000] terms “the disciplined self”. The main challenge
in the life of the working poor is the daily struggle to “keep it going,” to persevere in the face
of adversity, lest they share the fate of those around them who gave up: welfare dependency,
homelessness, crime, substance abuse, etc. Their often harsh judgements on those in the under-
class (especially Blacks) reflect their attributing deep poverty in large part to “giving up,” “not
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caring,” having “no values,” “no direction in life,” etc. As summarized by Lane [1959], they
express “the general view that success is a triumph of the will and a reflection of ability”.3
Both of these key findings —motivated beliefs and weakness of will— are closely echoed by
psychologists. The latter relates to self-control problems, which in recent years have attracted
increasing attention from economists. The former relates to a nexus of cognitive biases involving
attributions for success and failure, reward and punishment. People are commonly subject to
what Ross and Nisbett [1991] term “the fundamental attribution error,” namely an excessive
tendency to explain the behavior and outcomes of others by underlying dispositions rather than
external circumstances or luck. Relatedly, they commonly display the “illusion of control,”
namely an excessive confidence that they, and others, can affect their own environment and,
ultimately, their own fate. Closely related is what Lerner [1982] called the “Belief in a Just
World” (henceforth BJW), that is, the nearly universal human tendency to want to believe that
people generally get what they deserve.
Many experiments thus show how individuals systematically construe what they observe
so as to preserve this belief. A typical example is the reinterpretation of fortuitous rewards,
where subjects find imaginary merits and superior performances in the one person in a team
whom they know to have been preselected at random to receive the largest payment. Another
well-known set of experiments shows that when confronted with a person whose suffering they
can do nothing to alleviate, many people end up “blaming the victim” —finding reasons why he
brought the suffering on himself or invoking compensating differentials (a silver lining).4 Such
findings are not confined to the laboratory. For instance, Di Tella et al. [2004], exploiting a
rare “natural experiment” arising from the Argentinian government’s granting of land titles to
some very poor households, show how the beneficiaries of a pure windfall responded by adopting
increased beliefs that one can succeed on one’s own, that money is important for happiness, and
that others can be trusted.
Bringing together these remarkably convergent strands of evidence from economics, political
sociology and psychology, our model incorporates: a) a “demand side” for motivated beliefs,
arising from imperfect willpower (equivalently, divergent parent-child preferences) or from an-
ticipatory feelings, about this world or the next; b) a “supply side,” taking the form of selective
recall/awareness or that of parental indoctrination; c) general equilibrium interactions between
individuals’ cognitive choices, arising endogenously via the collective policy decision.
3 It is also notable that the question about “the poor” in the World Values Survey is whether the respondent
agrees or disagrees that they “are lazy or lack willpower”.
4The more extreme but nonetheless common case is that of self-blame by the victims themselves. Naturally,
different individuals subscribe to different degrees to the just-world view, and the scale devised by Peplau and Tyler
[1975] reveals very interesting correlates. High-BJW scorers are more likely to give stiff sentences to defendants
convicted of a crime such as negligent homicide, but also to find victims (e.g., in a rape case) more culpable
and “deserving” of their fate. They tend to see the status quo as desirable, to be politically and economically
conservative, to believe in an active god, and to be less cynical than others. They have a greater tendency to
justify the conditions of Blacks and women and a lower propensity to social and political activism. The BJW
score is also correlated with having a Protestant ethic and a strong belief in internal locus of control.
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The intergenerational interpretation of the model involves only standard forms of communica-
tion (at home or through schools and churches) and thus permits an entirely “classical” reading
of the paper. The intrapersonal interpretation corresponds to a more psychological view, in
which agents engage in a form of self-deception. Our paper thus brings into political economy
the recent work on cognitive dissonance, motivated beliefs, overconfidence, etc. [e.g., Akerlof
and Dickens, 1982; Carrillo and Mariotti, 2000; Bénabou and Tirole, 2002, 2004; Köszegi, 2005].
In stressing the links between beliefs about self-determination and redistributive policies, it is
also closely related to Piketty [1995] and to recent work by Cervellati et al. [2004] and especially
by Alesina and Angeletos [2005]. These last authors offer an alternative explanation for the
coexistence of low- and high-redistribution societies, in which distributive-justice concerns on
the part of voters give rise to multiple self-fulfilling beliefs about the share of income inequality
that is attributable to variations in effort. In our model the equilibria correspond instead to
divergent yet self-sustaining perceptions of the same reality —that is, to different ideologies.
II A model of ideology
A Technology and preferences
The economy is populated by a continuum of agents, i ∈ [0, 1], whose actions take place according
to the timeline on Figure II. Each produces period-2 output with the technology
(1) yi =
(
1 with probability πi + θei
0 with probability 1− (πi + θei)
,
where ei is the level of effort (or human capital investment) he chose in period 1 and πi reflects
his social background —resources or social capital inherited from the parents, discrimination,
etc.5 For a minority ϕ < 1/2 of agents πi takes a high value π1, while for the majority it is
π0 ≤ π1; we shall refer to these two classes as advantaged and disadvantaged, or simply rich and
poor. We let π¯ ≡ ϕπ1 + (1− ϕ)π0 and similarly denote by e¯ and y¯ = π¯ + θe¯ the (endogenous)
average levels of effort and output.
At the start of period 1, agents vote over a linear tax rate τ ≤ 1 that determines how market
incomes will be redistributed in period 2. As there is no reason to exclude regressive policies a
priori, we allow τ < 0. Imposing τ ∈ [0, 1] would not alter the results.
The true extent to which effort is rewarded in the long term, θ, is unknown. We shall consider
three possible sources of “demand” for just-world beliefs: functional, affective, and religious. In
this and the next section, demand for a positive outlook on θ will arise endogenously (though not
necessarily consciously) from the fact that it helps motivate oneself, or one’s children, toward
5 The specification (1) is similar to that of Piketty [1995]. All our results also obtain with a linear production
function, yi = πi+θei+ε (where E [ε] = 0), except for the one on stigma in Section III.D, which is more specific.
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Figure II: Timing of Signals and Actions
the pursuit of long-term goals.6 In Sections V and VI similar results will obtain when people
just derive comfort from thinking that they live in a world that is fair and predictable, as well
as when they are concerned about potential rewards and punishments in the afterlife.
We now focus on the first, motivation-based specification. The expected utility perceived by
individual i at t = 0, 1 is
(2) U it ≡ E
"
(1− τ)yi + τ y¯ −
¡
ei
¢2
2aβt
¯¯¯¯
¯Ωit
#
,
where τ is the tax rate he will face in period 2, Ωit his date-t information set and β1 ≡ β < 1 ≡ β0
represents a “salience of the present” affecting preferences at the time effort must be exerted.
Due to this form of imperfect willpower (β < 1), the effort choice ei will tend to be too low,
compared to the ex-ante desirable level. A formally equivalent interpretation of (2) is that U i0
represents parental preferences over their offspring’s level of human capital investment (e.g.,
effort in school), whereas U i1 describes the preferences of children themselves.
B Signals and beliefs
At t = 0 each agent receives a binary signal about the return to effort, θ. For simplicity, we take
these signals to be perfectly correlated, reflecting for instance some aggregate information.7
6 Indeed, Lerner’s (1982, p. 9) opening description of the “Belief in a Just World” is that “These assumptions...
are central to the ability to engage in long-term goal-directed activity. In order to plan, work for and obtain
things they want, and avoid those which are frightening or painful, people must assume that there are manageable
procedures which are effective in producing the desired states”. The motivation approach also fits closely with
the emphasis on willpower and perseverance that pervades the ethnographic evidence mentioned earlier.
7Conditionally independent draws from a distribution that depends on θ would lead to similar results. By
focusing on exogenous signals, we are abstracting from the possibility that the equilibrium tax rate τ may reveal
information about θ. As explained in Section III.B, however, one can choose parameters so that it does not.
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Thus, with probability 1−q everyone receives bad news, σi = L, and with probability q they
receive no news, σi = ∅. This “no news is good news” assumption serves only to simplify the
analysis and is inessential to the results (see Section III.B). By an abuse of language, we will
sometimes refer to σ = L and σ = ∅ as the informative and uninformative states of the world.
The expected return to effort in each state is denoted
(3) θL ≡ E [θ |σ = L] < E [θ |σ = ∅] ≡ θH ,
and the difference ∆θ ≡ θH − θL. Just after receiving the date-zero signal σi ∈ {L,∅}, agent i’s
information set is Ωi0. Later on, however, when voting on taxes and choosing effort, he may no
longer be aware of, or reliably recollect, the initial news; see Figures II and IIIa. Equivalently,
his parents may have learned σi but withheld the information. Agent i’s information set Ωi1 at
t = 1 is thus based instead on a recollection or parental account of the original signal, which we
denote as σˆi ∈ {L,∅}.
Figure IIIb describes the cognitive technology through which individuals can (partially)
manipulate their own beliefs, or those of their children, about whether or not the world is
“just”. Formally, the probability
(4) λ ≡ Pr [σˆ = L | σ = L]
that any signal will later on be recalled can be increased or decreased, at some cost M(λ). This
may involve expending real resources (eliminating evidence, avoiding certain cues and social
interactions), time (searching for and rehearsing reassuring information, for instance through
political activism or religious participation), psychic costs (stress from repression), or reputation
(misleading one’s children, who may eventually find out). A typical awareness-cost function will
have a U-shape, minimized at some costless “natural” rate of recall λ¯ ≤ 1. For simplicity we
specify M(λ) as piecewise linear, with a lower bound λ on feasible rates of awareness (or a
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maximum degree of repression 1 − λ) and constant marginal costs m and m0 for information
suppression and rehearsal respectively; see Figure IIIb.8
Assumption 1 The memory cost function is given byM(λ) = +∞ for λ < λ, M(λ) = m(λ¯−λ)
for λ ∈ [λ, λ¯] and M(λ) = m0(λ− λ¯) for λ ≥ λ¯, where 0 ≤ λ < λ¯ ≤ 1.
In equilibrium, the optimal awareness rate λ will be determined jointly with the political
outcome τ and be the same for all agents. For the moment, the only important features of the
belief mechanism are that: a) λ can be less than 1; b) individuals understand, to some extent,
that they and others may have a systematic tendency to see or present the world in a “positive”
light. Consequently, they do not take the absence of adverse recollections (σˆi = ∅), or their
parents’ exhortations that effort pays and crime does not, at face value. Instead, they assess the
reliability of a “no bad news” message, σˆi = ∅, as
(5) r =
q
q + χ(1− q)(1− λ) ≡ r
∗(λ |χ),
where λ denotes the rate of information transmission used by everyone in equilibrium. The
parameter χ ∈ [0, 1] measures agents’ degree of cognitive sophistication, allowing the model to
cover the whole range between full Bayesian rationality (χ = 1) and complete naiveté (χ = 0).9
Agents’ posterior beliefs when they vote and work,
(6) µi ≡ Pr
£
σi = ∅ | Ωi1
¤
,
are thus equal to µi = 0 for “pessimists” who recall σˆi = L and to µi = r for (qualified)
“optimists” for whom σˆi = ∅.
Throughout the paper we shall maintain the parallel interpretations of our model as describ-
ing either: a) adult individuals who strive to maintain a certain view of the world and engage
in costly dissonance-reduction when they encounter a piece of data that does not fit with it;
or b) a mechanism for the intergenerational transmission of beliefs and “values,” with parents
8For evidence from the psychology literature on the selective accessibility of past data, see Bénabou and Tirole
[2002]. The idea that people can repress the recall of certain memories is also receiving new support from brain
imaging [O’Connor, 2004]. There is also evidence of the malleability of beliefs specifically pertaining to markets
and distributional justice and of some of the cognitive processes involved. Kay and Jost [2003] show that just
reading a vignette about fictional (poor, rich)×(happy, unhappy) or (poor, rich)×(honest, dishonest) characters
significant affects subjects’ views about the justice of the American economic and political system. In both the
United States and post-transition Hungary, Jost et al. [2003] find subjects’ scores on Paulhus’ [1984] self-deception
scale to be robust predictors of their tendency to endorse the market system as fair and efficient.
9Our main results, namely the multiplicity of equilibria with different values of λ and the ranking of the
associated tax rates in the state in which agents actually implement these cognitive strategies, hold for all χ ∈ [0, 1].
The ranking of tax rates in the uninformative state (σ = ∅) is generally ambiguous, and only when χ is small
enough can we ensure that it remains the same. As discussed in Section III.B, this reflects the fact that while
Bayesian agents’ beliefs in each state of the world may be distorted, the average across states must still equal
the prior. Any model of belief manipulation (self-deception, child indoctrination, propaganda, religion, etc.) that
explicitly deals with information flows and agents’ inferences will inevitably share similar constraints on making
comparative predictions that hold across all states of the world.
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devoting time and resources to shielding their children’s belief in a just world, where effort is
ultimately rewarded, from evidence that life may not be so fair after all.10
C Effort decisions
Knowing the redistributive environment he will face, each agent chooses effort optimally as a
function of his beliefs about the expected return:
ei = aβ(1− τ)θ(µi), where(7)
θ(µi) ≡ E[θ | Ωi1] = µiθH + (1− µi)θL.(8)
His policy preferences, on the other hand, depend also on his beliefs about other agents’ beliefs,
as these determine the tax base from which transfers will be financed:
E[y¯ | Ωi1] = π¯ +E[θe¯ | Ωi1] = π¯ + aβ(1− τ)Γ(µi |λ, r),
where
(9) Γ(µi |λ, r) ≡ E
∙
θ ·
Z 1
0
θ(µj) dj
¯¯¯¯
Ωi1
¸
= µiθHθ(r) + (1− µi)θL [λθL + (1− λ)θ(r)] .
Indeed, in state σ = ∅ everyone has the same posterior µj = r, whereas in state σ = L a fraction
λ of agents have µj = 0 and the remaining 1−λ have µj = r, where λ is the equilibrium awareness
rate and r = r∗(λ |χ). When no confusion results, the dependence of Γ on the equilibrium (r, λ)
will be kept implicit and we shall simply write Γ(µi). The same convention will apply to all
functions derived from Γ, such as agents’ welfare levels and preferred tax rates.
Substituting (7)-(9) into (2) yields agent i’s expected utility U i1 at the time effort is chosen.
Prior to that moment his preferences are the same, except that the cost of effort is not yet
magnified by the salience parameter 1/β. Defining
V (τ , πi, µi ) ≡ (1− τ)
£
πi + aβ(1− τ)θ(µi)2
¤
+τ
£
π¯ + aβ(1− τ)Γ(µi)
¤
− aβ
2
2γ
(1− τ)2θ(µi)2(10)
allows us to capture ex ante (γ = 1) as well as ex post (γ = β) preferences, thus covering both
the case where voters use tax policy to remedy the time-consistency problem (γ = 1) and that
where they do not (γ = β), for instance because τ and ei are chosen simultaneously.11
10The belief-manipulation “technology” described above, introduced in Bénabou and Tirole [2002] has been
applied in an intrapersonal context by Kopczuk and Slemrod [2005] and in an intergenerational one by Dessi
[2004]. An alternative approach focuses on the parental transmission of preferences [Bisin and Verdier, 2000].
11For simplicity we assume that voters vote sincerely and do not condition their choice of τ on being pivotal.
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D Socioeconomic status, beliefs, and political attitudes
Assuming for the moment an interior optimum, agents i’s ideal tax rate is given by the solution
to ∂V i(τ , πi, µi )/∂τ = 0, namely
(11) T (πi, µi ) ≡ 1−
1 +
¡
πi − π¯
¢
/
£
aβΓ(µi)
¤
2− (2− β/γ) θ(µi)2/Γ(µi) .
This expression embodies three intuitive effects. First, in the numerator, a lower relative
endowment πi − π¯ naturally increases the desired tax rate. Whether progressive or regressive,
such redistributive goals must be traded off against distortions to the effort-elastic component
of the tax base, which is proportional to Γ(µi) and thus becomes more of a concern when
effort is expected to be productive. Second, and most important, the denominator of (11) shows
how subjective prospects of upward mobility (POUM) reduce the desired tax rate: an optimistic
individual plans on working hard and thus expects to move up in the income distribution, relative
to low-effort pessimists.12 This is most apparent when πi = π¯, in which case T decreases with
the ratio θ(µi)2/Γ(µi) between the agent’s own expected output from effort and the average he
expects others to produce with their labor; this ratio is higher for an optimist (µi = r) than
for a pessimist (µi = 0). The last determinant of T relates to time preference: when agents use
fiscal policy to correct for the suboptimality of effort (γ = 1), T is lower (perhaps even negative,
representing a subsidy to labor supply) than when they do not (γ = β).
The following assumptions ensure that voters’ preferences over τ are single-peaked and that,
as the poor become more optimistic about the return to effort, the combination of the POUM
effect and increased concern about tax distortions reduces their desired level or redistribution.
Assumption 2 Let: (i) ∆θ/θL < 2β/γ and (ii) (π¯ − π0) /βa < θ2L.
In equilibrium, agents are either pessimists (µi = 0) or optimists (µi = r), depending on
their recollected signal. Accordingly, we define the functions
(12) Tpess(π) ≡ T (π, 0) and Topt(π ) ≡ T (π, r ).
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 2, each agent’s preferences V (τ , πi, µi ) are strictly concave
in τ and his ideal policy is τ i = Tpess(πi) when he is aware of an adverse signal (σˆi = L)
and Topt(πi) when he is not (σˆi = ∅). These preferred tax rates are decreasing in the initial
endowment πi and ordered as follows:
Topt(π1) ≤ Topt(π0) < Tpess(π0) < 1,
12See Bénabou and Ok [2001] for an analysis of the POUM effect in the context of exogenous, known mobility
processes, and Alesina and La Ferrara [2005] for empirical evidence of its importance in determining voters’
attitudes towards redistribution.
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with strict inequality when π0 < π1. Moreover, Topt(π1) < 0 and, if (π¯ − π0) /βa > (1− β/γ) θ2L,
then Tpess(π0) > 0.
These results are in line with empirical studies such as Fong [2001] and Alesina and La
Ferrara [2005], which show that beliefs in self-determination reduce individuals’ demand for
redistribution13 and that both believers and skeptics are found in every social class.
We next consider how these political preferences are aggregated through voting. In the no-
information state of the world, σ = ∅, things are quite simple: everyone has posterior µ = r,
so with the poor forming a majority the equilibrium tax outcome is Topt(π0). Consider now the
informative state of the world, σ = L. By Proposition 1, the pessimistic poor always want the
highest tax rate, Tpess(π0). If the equilibrium awareness rate λ is high enough that (1−ϕ)λ > 1/2,
they will be a majority and impose their choice. When (1−ϕ)λ < 1/2, on the other hand, some
group with less extreme preferences will be pivotal. Two cases may occur.
Case 1: if Tpess(π1) ≤ Topt(π0), then max {Tpess(π1), Topt(π1)} < Topt(π0) < Tpess(π0). Since
individuals with π = π0 are a majority the pivotal group is now that of the optimistic poor, who
set the tax rate Topt(π0).
Case 2: if Tpess(π1) > Topt(π0), then Topt(π1) < Topt(π0) < Tpess(π1) < Tpess(π0). If λ < 1/2
the optimists (rich plus poor) constitute a majority, so the pivotal group is again the optimistic
poor and the tax rate Topt(π0). If λ > 1/2, on the other hand, the pivotal group is that of the
pessimistic rich, who set the tax rate Tpess(π1).
Corollary 1 As λ falls below λ∗ ≡ 1/[2(1 − ϕ)] ∈ (1/2, 1), the pivotal vote switches from the
pessimistic poor to a group that desires a lower tax rate.
This result is illustrated by the “Political Equilibrium” locus in Figure IV. Of course each
agent’s awareness rate is endogenous, resulting from ideological or indoctrination choices made
earlier on. We now turn to the determination of these motivated beliefs.
E Ideology as a cognitive investment
Consider agent i’s decision problem at t = 0. Given the informational structure, the only state
in which he has a choice with respect to his own or his offspring’s worldview is when σi = L.
Is it better to acknowledge the bad news, or to try and maintain an optimistic outlook? An
individual who ends up with belief µi will exert effort ei = βa(1−τ)θ(µi), where τ is the tax rate
that will predictably emerge from the majority vote, given the cognitive strategy (λ, r) followed
by everyone else. Substituting into (2), his (ex-ante) intertemporal utility will then be
(13) U i0 = (1− τ)πi + τ π¯ + aβτ(1− τ)θL [λθL + (1− λ)θ(r)] + U˜L(τ , µi ),
13Strictly speaking, the proposition shows this result only for the poor (π = π0), who are the majority group.
Under additional conditions one can ensure it for the rich (π = π1) as well, but this is not required for our analysis.
Note also that, by introducing a public good, one could ensure that tax rates are always positive.
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where
(14) U˜L(τ , µi ) ≡ aβ(1− τ)2θ(µi)
£
θL − (β/2) θ(µi)
¤
.
The agent thus recognizes that while his effort at t = 1 will be based on a possibly higher ex-
pected return θ(µi), its productivity will still be θL; see (14). Similarly, his forecast of aggregate
output in (13) is independent of µi, as it reflects the return to effort θL and belief distribution
(λ, 1− λ) predicted by the true signal σ = L.
At t = 1, if the agent recalls σˆi = L he will be a pessimist (µi = 0), whereas if σˆi = ∅ he
will be an optimist (µi = r). From (14), the cognitive decision problem following the signal σi =
L is thus
(15) max
λ0∈[0,1]
½
βa(1− τ)2
∙
λ0
µ
1− β
2
¶
θ2L + (1− λ0)
µ
θL −
β
2
θ(r)
¶
θ(r)
¸
−M(λ0)
¾
,
whereM(λ0) is the cost of achieving a rate of information transmission λ0, as discussed in Section
II.B. Two key effects are apparent in this expression:
— The role of time inconsistency. When β ≈ 1, the term in brackets is maximized at λ0 = 1:
information is always valuable. Conversely, when β ≈ 0 it is maximized at λ0 = 0, reflecting the
fact that sustaining motivation is critical.14
— The role of taxes. Assume that β is low enough that dissonance reduction is valuable. Then,
the lower is τ , the greater is each individual or parent’s incentive to invest in a just-world
ideology —that is, to choose a low λ0. This general-equilibrium feedback is a source of endogenous
complementarity between individuals’ ideological choices.
With the piecewise linear specification of M(·) in Assumption 1, the solution to (15) is
“bang-bang”: the optimal awareness rate is either λ or λ¯,15 depending on whether τ is above or
below some (easily computed) threshold τ∗. This is illustrated by the “Motivated Beliefs” locus
in Figure IV.
III American “Belief in a JustWorld” vs. European “Pessimism”
“I have never met in America a citizen so poor as not to cast a glance of hope and envy on the
enjoyments of the rich or whose imagination did not possess itself by anticipation of those good
things that fate still obstinately withheld from him.” (De Tocqueville, [1835]).
14Both claims follow from the fact that the term multiplying λ0 in (15) is proportional to (β/2)(θ(r)+θL)−θL.
15 In general, the optimal strategy could also involve rehearsing bad news, i.e. λ0 = 1 > λ¯. This case (which is
not very different from λ0 = λ¯) will be ruled out as an equilibrium later on, however; see (22).
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Figure IV: Equilibrium Policies and Ideologies (BJW: Belief in a Just World; RP: Realistic Pessimism).
A Equilibrium outcomes
A politico-economic equilibrium is a triple (λ, r, τ) such that, in state L,
λ ∈ arg max
λ0∈[0,1]
n
λ0U˜L(τ , 0 ) + (1− λ0)U˜L(τ , r )−M(λ0)
o
,(16)
r =
q
q + χ(1− q)(1− λ) ,(17)
τ : is the majority tax rate, given the distribution of beliefs induced by (λ, r),(18)
and in state σ = ∅ the majority tax rate is Topt(π0), given by (11)-(12) as a function of (λ, r).
Under conditions that we shall identify, the political and psychological mechanisms embodied
in these equations and illustrated on Figure IV give rise two equilibria —one broadly descriptive
of Western Europe, the other of the United States.
1. Realistic Pessimism / Welfare State. When agents have a high recall rate (λ = λ¯ > λ∗),
enough of the poor end up with pessimistic beliefs (µi = 0) to constitute a majority and impose
a high tax rate, τ¯ . The expectation of substantial redistribution (τ¯ > τ∗) and therefore a low
net return to effort, in turn, generates only weak incentives to deny that θ is low. So agents
indeed make no effort at dissonance reduction, choosing the natural awareness rate λ¯.
2. Belief in a Just World / Laissez Faire. When agents try hard to ignore discouraging
news about the efficacy of individual effort (λ = λ < λ∗), enough people end up with relatively
optimistic beliefs (µi = r¯) to make the poor among them the pivotal group: 1 − λ > 1/2.16
16Allowing for the possibility that the pessimistic rich may instead become pivotal (by assuming only (1−ϕ)λ <
1/2) would not change the main results, since this group also wants less redistribution than the pessimistic poor.
Letting λ < 1/2 reduces the number of cases to consider and yields other desirable properties, discussed below.
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The expectation of a relatively low tax rate (τ < τ∗), in turn, generates strong incentives to
believe that θ is high. So people indeed make significant efforts at maintaining such a worldview,
forgetting (or minimizing to their children) any dissonant information at a high rate 1− λ.
We now formally establish the existence of the BJW and RP equilibria.17 Readers who wish
to skip this step may go directly to the next subsection.
We start from the parameters λ and λ of the awareness technology in Assumption 1, then
define r ≡ r∗(λ;χ) and r¯ = r∗(λ¯;χ) from the updating rule (17), and θ(r) and θ (r¯) from (8).
Assumption 3 Let: (i) λ < 1/2 < (1− ϕ)λ¯ and (ii) (1− λ r) / [1 + r (∆θ/2θL)] ≤ β/γ.
The first condition ensures that the pivotal group switches from the pessimistic poor to the
optimistic poor as λ declines from λ¯ to λ. The role of the second one (which automatically holds
when γ = β) will become apparent below. Next, we use (11) to compute
τ¯ ≡ Tpess(π0 |λ¯, r¯) = T (π0 , 0|λ¯, r¯),(19)
τ ≡ Topt(π0 |λ, r) = T (π0, r |λ, r),(20)
making here explicit the dependence of an agent’s preferred policy on the beliefs of others
(through Γ(µi |λ, r); see (9)). A first question is whether it is indeed the case that τ < τ¯ . This is
far from obvious, since knowing that others are likely to be more optimistic (due to their using
the recall strategy λ rather than λ¯) and therefore to work harder, tends to make poor agents
want to tax more. We show, however, that this tax-base effect is dominated (comparing across
potential equilibria) by their concerns over tax distortions and their own mobility prospects.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 3(ii), the tax rates defined by (19)-(20) are such that τ < τ¯ .
The last requirement for multiplicity is that the incentive to forget or repress bad news about
θ, net of the cost required, be positive in a low-tax environment but negative in a high-tax one:
(21) U˜L(τ¯ , r¯)− U˜L(τ¯ , 0) < m < U˜L(τ , r)− U˜L(τ , 0).
If λ¯ < 1, it must also be that no one wants to rehearse bad news (to avoid overconfidence):
(22) U˜L(τ¯ , 0)− U˜L(τ¯ , r¯) < m0,
while the analogue of (22) for (λ, r) follows from (21). Clearly, if
(23) max
n
U˜L(τ¯ , r¯ )− U˜L(τ¯ , 0), 0
o
< U˜L(τ , r)− U˜L(τ , 0),
17 In addition to these extremal equilibria, there may also be an unstable equilibrium where the first-order
condition for (17) holds with equality at some λ ∈ (λ, λ¯).
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the fixed-point conditions given by (21) will be satisfied for all m > 0 in the appropriate range.
Assumption 4, given in the appendix, provides conditions on the model’s parameters that are
sufficient for (22)-(23) to hold, leading to our main result.
Proposition 3 Let Assumptions 2—4 be satisfied. For a range of values of the denial cost m
(and for all m0 > 0), there exist two politico-economic equilibria, such that:
1) Agent’s awareness rate in the informative state (σ = L) is λ in the BJW equilibrium and λ¯
in the RP equilibrium, with associated tax rates τ and τ¯ , such that λ < λ¯ and τ < τ¯ . Average
effort and output are higher in the BJW equilibrium.
2) In the no-information state (σ = ∅) the rankings of tax rates, effort and output across the
two equilibria depend on parameters. If π1 − π0 and χ are small enough, in particular, there
exist values of λ and λ¯ such that these rankings remain the same as in the informative state.
B Implications and robustness
1. Ideology, redistribution, and national income. Our central results pertain to the state of
the world in which agents actually receive news (hard information) about θ, namely here the
not-so-just state σ = L. This is the most relevant one, as only then are individuals faced with
an actual cognitive decision, allowing the key issue of dissonance reduction to arise. (The state
σ = ∅ is discussed below, however). Proposition 3 shows that both awareness and redistribution
are then lower in the BJW equilibrium than in its RP counterpart. This endogenously shared
“American Dream” ideology has several important implications. On the macroeconomic side,
it results in higher aggregate effort and output, both because agents are more optimistic about
the (pretax) return to effort and because they face lower tax rates than in the “European”
equilibrium. On the welfare side, it improves agents’ effort motivation (or time-inconsistency
problem) and causes less distortions to the tax base; it also leads them to incur greater cognitive
costs, however, which reduces these gains.18 Its net value to the poor is much more ambiguous,
since they receive less transfers and, as explained below, are more likely to be stigmatized.
2. Social mobility. As noted earlier, the widespread perception (especially in the United
States itself) of modern American society as exceptionally mobile is at odds with the empirical
evidence: comparative studies of intergenerational mobility show, on average, no significant dif-
ference with European countries. Our model is consistent with these findings: in any equilibrium
(λ, r) and state σ ∈ {L,∅}, the transition matrix between the advantaged / disadvantaged and
the economic success / failure social classes has the same eigenvalues, implying that standard
18The ex-ante welfare calculus is substantially more complex. In state σ = L, agents’ greater optimism and
the lower tax rate under the BJW equilibrium lead to a net welfare gain, for the two reasons just mentioned.
In state σ = ∅, however, the “Bayesian skepticism” discussed below may result in lower effort under the BJW
equilibrium (see Proposition 3), which is particularly costly since σ = ∅ is the most productive state. The net
welfare outcome thus depends on parameters, and in particular on agents’ degree of Bayesian sophistication. For
instance, if χ is small, welfare in state σ = ∅ is unaffected, leading to a net gain. If χ is close to 1 there can be a
net loss, as shown in a partial-equilibrium context in Bénabou and Tirole (2002).
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measures of mobility are independent of (λ, r, τ , σ).19 This invariance of relative mobility may be
contrasted to the ranking of absolute mobility, namely the probability of achieving yi = 1 rather
than yi = 0, which is both truly higher, as people work harder, and generally overestimated (as
fewer agents are aware that σ = L) in the American-type equilibrium.
Finally, while our model does not have agents investing in financial assets (in addition to
human capital, which is one possible interpretation of ei) it seems clear that, with such an
extension, the steeper lifetime profile of labor earnings which they anticipate (in part, correctly)
in the BJW equilibrium would lead them to save less. In addition to trans-Atlantic differences
in policy, labor supply and per capita income, our model may thus also help explain the lower
American savings rate.
3. Sophistication or naivete? In the uninformative state (σ = ∅), the ranking of tax rates
across equilibria is generally less clear. This ambiguity is due to the “rational skepticism” of
Bayesian agents, who are aware of their own or their parents’ systematic tendency to censor
bad news. The lower the probability λ with which such news are transmitted, the lower one’s
confidence r∗(λ;χ) that none were indeed received. Thus, voters’ expectations of their own
productivity θ(r) and of the product of others’ efforts Γ(r) are now lower in the BJW equilibrium
(λ = λ) than in its RP counterpart (λ = λ¯). This effect vanishes in the limit as χ → 0 : when
agents “forget that they forget,” r = r¯ = 1. Tax rates following σ = ∅ then exactly coincide in
the two equilibria, and the overall correlation structure is entirely determined by what happens
when σ = L.20 When χ > 0, the effect on the equilibrium outcome of agents’ doubting their
recall (or parents) can go either way, but one can identify sufficient conditions (such as those in
Proposition 3) for the results to remain the same as in the informative state.21
4. Who is “right”? It is worth emphasizing that neither the model’s main message nor the
source of its results is that “Americans” have a less accurate vision of economic mobility than
“Europeans”. What really matters is only that their worldview (in the state of the world where
there is information) be more optimistic —whether rightly or wrongly. To see this, instead of σ ∈
{L,∅} let us now assume that “no news are bad news”: σ ∈ {H,∅}, with E (θ |H) > E (θ |∅) .
Agents’ cognitive decision in the informative state σ = H is then how much to invest in reminding
themselves, and conveying to their children, that the world is just —which it really is. There
will be more investments and celebrations of that type (raising λ above λ¯) in the American-like
19Let ΦL(τ |λ, r) ≡ aβ(1− τ)θL [λθL + (1− λ)θ(r)] and ΦH(τ |λ, r) ≡ aβ(1− τ)θHθ(r). The mobility matrix is
Mσ(λ, r) ≡
?
1− π0 −Φσ(τ |λ, r) π0 +Φσ(τ |λ, r)
1− π1 −Φσ(τ |λ, r) π1 +Φσ(τ |λ, r)
?
,
with eigenvalues 1 and π1 − π0. Cross-sectional inequality, by contrast, does vary with the equilibrium and the
realized state, but in a non-monotonic way, as it is proportional to [π¯ +Φσ(τ |λ, r)] [1− π¯ −Φσ(τ |λ, r)] .
20Note also from (5) that with naive agents (χ → 0), the probability q with which state σ = ∅ occurs can be
arbitrarily close to zero.
21As shown by (11), T (π0, r |λ, r) depends negatively on (π¯ − π0)/Γ(r) through the tax base effect and on
θ(r)2/Γ(r) through the POUM effect. The first force tends to make T decline with r, but becomes small when
endowments do not differ much. The second one can go either way, depending on whether θ2 or Γ responds more.
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equilibrium than in the (now unduly pessimistic) European one, and again this will be mutually
sustaining with lower redistribution.22
5. Learning from taxes? One may worry that sophisticated agents could infer from the
realized tax rate which state of the world they are in, thus defeating the purpose of their
investing in “the American dream”. Note first that with λ < 1/2, the BJW tax rate is the same
in both states (τ = T (π0, r |λ, r)) and thus uninformative. In the RP equilibrium it differs across
states, but since agents are not investing in beliefs (λ = λ¯) no cognitive decisions are affected.
If we let λ¯ = 1, this additional source of information is irrelevant for effort and voting as well. A
more important and general point is that any information agents might retrieve about θ (e.g.,
from observing output realizations, the fact that opinions differ, or the political choices of other
countries) is of the very same type as the original signal σ (and in our simple model, perfectly
correlated with it), so that they have exactly the same incentives to forget or deny it as they
had for σ.23
C Initial conditions and ideological shifts
Suppose that the payoff to success increases to X > 1, capturing for instance the rise in the
returns to education over the last 25 years. As shown on Figure V, such skill-biased technical
change has two effects. First, the equilibrium policy locus shifts down (over the range where the
poor are pivotal), as it is now more costly to distort effort; the critical value λ∗ ≡ 1/[2(1− ϕ)],
remains invariant, however. Second, the motivated-beliefs locus shifts up, as a proper motivation
to study, work hard, etc., becomes more valuable, making “positive” beliefs in self-determination
and the justness of market rewards even more adaptive than before.24
Putting both effects together yields the most interesting point. Whereas, by itself, the rise
in X would lead only to a relatively small decline in redistribution in each equilibrium, when
ideology is endogenous it can trigger a substantial shift in beliefs about self-reliance (even though
θ has not changed) that can cause the Welfare-State equilibrium to unravel, leaving only the
Laissez Faire outcome.25 The same comparative statics can help understand the role of historical
conditions in the selection of equilibria. If the initial generations who settled in America were
22The two polar specifications of the information structure could also be combined into a symmetric one, with
σ ∈ {L,∅,H}. The American equilibrium would then have a lower recall rate λL in state L and a higher one λH
in state H than its European counterpart. These two cognitive manipulations are even strategic complements:
choosing a low (high) λL makes one more (less) skeptical in the recall state σˆi = ∅, which increases (decreases)
the incentive to choose a high λH .
23This recurrent desire of agents to avoid or distort information distinguishes our model from that of Piketty
(1995). In his framework agents are always “hungry” for accurate information, so when they are able to observe
the political choices of other people or countries it is necessary to add heterogenous priors to the costly learning
process in order to prevent convergence to the truth.
24Formally, as X rises everyone increases their effort in proportion, so: a) voter’s desired tax rates are still given
by (11) but with a now scaled up to aX; b) in (15), the economic payoffs are scaled up by X2, reflecting both the
direct productivity effect and the effort response; equivalently, the cognitive function M(λ) is scaled down by X2.
25Other models where skill-biased technical change can undermine —through very different channels that do not
involve ideology— the sustainability of the Welfare State include Hassler et al. (2003) and Bénabou (2005).
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Figure V: Economic Shocks and Induced Ideological Shifts
self-selected to have a low disutility for effort (a high a), the effect is exactly the same as that
of a temporarily high X. One can also point to their religious background as one that made
effort-promoting beliefs particularly desirable (see Section VI for an explicit application of the
model to the Protestant ethic); such parameters again move the the two loci in ways that tend
to make the BJW equilibrium unique. Conversely, one can think of the Great Depression as a
large and “memorable” shock (a decrease in X or a negative signal σ = L about θ, with perhaps
a high associated m) which, although temporary, triggered a durable change in attitudes toward
wealth and poverty that made possible a radically new set of redistributive institutions.
Beyond such discontinuities, the more general point is that the endogenous response of
ideology to economic or political shocks has a multiplier effect that can significantly amplify
and prolong their impact on redistributive institutions and real activity. We shall encounter
related amplification mechanisms when analyzing the effectiveness of political propaganda or
the spread of consumerism later on.
D The lazy poor
Suppose that a fraction x of the population are “lazy,” meaning that they have no willpower
with respect to effort, β = 0. We assume for simplicity that laziness and initial endowments πi
are uncorrelated and that x is small enough that the presence of these agents does not affect
any of the political equilibria constructed before (or perhaps they do not even vote).
Let us now ask what attributions people will make concerning the causes of poverty. When
thinking of a person j with ex-post income yj = 0, an agent with belief µi that effort pays will
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assess the probability that j’s condition is due to laziness as:
(24) pi ≡ Pr
£
βj = 0 | yj = 0,Ωi1
¤
=
(1− π¯)x
(1− π¯)x+ (1− x) [(1− π¯ − aβ(1− τ)Γ(µi)] .
Focussing again on the informative state (σ = L), pi tends to be higher in the BJW than in
the RP equilibrium, for two reasons. First, 1 − τ is higher, implying a greater incentive to
work (hence likelihood of success) for any non-lazy person. Second, the majority of agents are
optimists, whose estimate of the average contribution of effort to success is higher than that of
the pessimistic majority which prevails in the RP equilibrium (Γ(r) > Γ(0)).
There is thus a greater prevalence of stigma on the (ex-post) poor in a BJW equilibrium —a
result in line with the international surveys cited in the introduction, the ethnographic inter-
views conducted by Lamont [2000] in the United Sates and France and Gilens’ [1999] study of
Americans’ views of welfare recipients. These negative perceptions will likely generate resent-
ment, or at best a lack of empathy, in the rest of the population; indeed, there is strong evidence
that people want to help only “those who help themselves” (e.g. Fong [2001], Kangas [2003],
Bowles et al. [2005]). Incorporating such selective altruism into the model would clearly cause
the BJW-induced stigma to depress transfers even further.26
IV Propaganda: supply and demand
The pervasiveness of American-Dream, land-of-opportunity “boosterism” in the media, educa-
tion and culture of the United States throughout its history has been documented by many
authors, most recently Hochschild [1995] and Alesina and Glaeser [2004]. The latter also point
to the converse role played by unions and the education system in the dissemination of left-wing
ideas in Europe, to which we would add the influence of prominent intellectuals.
At the same time, beliefs are not just passively molded by a top-down supply of propaganda.
First, the ethnographic and experimental-psychology evidence consistently indicates that peo-
ple want to believe. Second, examples like the Soviet Union show that even a monopolistic,
omnipresent stream of misinformation cannot, by itself, durably sway minds in the face of a
contradictory reality. This is a fortiori true in democratic, well-informed societies. For propa-
ganda to work most effectively, people must be receptive to it —it must serve and exploit some
“need” that they consciously or unconsciously perceive.27 The puzzle in the United States-
Europe contrast has thus always been why their working classes proved differentially amenable
26 In the US context, a central role in the stigma associated with poverty and welfare recipiency is also played
by racial stereotypes [Gilens, 1999, Alesina et al., 2001], a phenomenon from which we abstract here.
27Classical cases are scapegoating (finding others to blame for one’s misfortunes —economic hardship or stag-
nation, military defeat) and downward social comparisons (finding some group to feel superior to). It would be
quite interesting to combine such psychologically based demands with Glaeser’s (2006) model of the strategic
supply of hateful messages about ethnic minorities by politicians pursuing partisan distributive agendas.
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to populist/socialist versus pro-market doctrines, given exposure to both.28 A theory of political
propaganda, like a theory of advertising or a theory of religion, should also include the “demand
side”. Our model provides such a building block.
Let us think of “unjust-world” signals (σ = L) being periodically received by certain seg-
ments of society, then relayed to the whole population by left-wing parties or unions. The model
then explains why, in an American-type equilibrium, people would not want to hear such mes-
sages, would try to dismiss them, keep them out of schools, etc., whereas in a European-type
equilibrium they would be much more receptive. Conversely, if there periodically occur signals
favorable to markets and individualism (σ = H, as discussed earlier), right-wing parties seek-
ing to disseminate them would find an audience much more willing to listen to, rehearse and
celebrate these stories in the American Dream equilibrium than in the other one. Given such
differential returns to left- and right-wing indoctrination, even a symmetric supply mechanism
(and a fortiori one where the incumbent side had greater resources) would lead to a trans-Atlantic
polarization of the dominant discourses.
Our model also indicates that the evidence presented by Alesina and Glaeser [2004] in support
of the “top-down” view of ideology (in which the side that has a given advantage in the supply of
propaganda gets to shape the beliefs of a public that passively absorbs what it is fed) is equally
compatible with demand variations playing instead the predominant role.
These authors first explain how factors such as a majoritarian (rather than proportional)
representation system, a larger land area or an ethnically homogeneous population can make
it easier for the Right to be or remain in power and block redistribution, in particular by
facilitating its indoctrination of the masses. They then present scatterplots showing that in
advanced countries with such characteristics, smaller fractions of the population believe that luck
determines incomes and greater ones that the poor are lazy. These correlations are interpreted
as supporting the view that “ideology is a by-product of, or at best a natural accompaniment
to, national policies on welfare, and not a separate cause”.
While thought-provoking, these findings are not sufficient to resolve the issue. Concerning
land area, the negative correlation appears entirely due to three outliers —the United States,
Canada and Australia. These also happen to be the “open frontier” giants where the availability
of free land created a genuine equality of opportunity for the initial generations of settlers
and immigrants. Thus, as suggested by many analysts of American history, the most likely
role of land abundance was to shape initial views on opportunity and social mobility —akin to
selecting the BJW equilibrium in our model— rather than to facilitate control of the masses by
28The rich array of historical quotations provided by Alesina and Glaeser [2004] confirm that: a) there was no
lack of prominent populist and anti-rich discourse in the US (even leaving aside Marxism) during the late 19th
and early 20th centuries; it just did not take hold; b) in Europe, governments and education systems were hardly
less conservative than in the US until at least the post-World War I period —and in many cases, we would argue,
much later: it was only post-World War II or even in the 1960’s that left-leaning teachers and unions overturned
the long-standing conservative dominance of education in countries such as France.
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the wealthy.29 Concerning the system of representation, in the long run it is a choice variable,
which a number of countries have indeed altered.30 Even ethnic heterogeneity can be viewed
as partially endogenous, through immigration policy; more importantly, this third correlation
admits multiple interpretations, including (as discussed by Alesina and Glaeser) the majority
ethnic group simply being prejudiced toward minorities.
Let us nonetheless accept that exogenous factors linked to geography, ethnic fragmentation
or inertial political institutions create a bias in favor of the Right in the American “political
technology”: our model then predicts the same three correlations with beliefs as those just
described. Going back to Figure IV, a pro-rich bias in the political system translates into a
downward and/or leftward shift of the equilibrium tax locus (for instance, disenfranchising some
of the poor reduces λ∗). This, in turn, tends to trigger a shift in equilibrium beliefs that makes
the welfare-state equilibrium vanish, leaving only the laissez-faire outcome.31 Moreover, this
endogenous shift in ideology (coming about through any combination of individual cognitive
investments or changed receptivity to propaganda) is a much larger contributor to the final
difference in policies than the initial exogenous variation in political technology.
Our point is of course not that political beliefs and propaganda are all demand-driven, but
rather that cross-country correlations cannot be taken as evidence that they are essentially
supply-driven and ideologies just imposed top-down. More generally, beliefs may respond to
exogenous variations in political institutions and yet also powerfully shape these institutions.
V Culture as collective belief
A Consumerist versus leisure-oriented societies
The model can also shed light on attitudinal differences, both within and across countries, con-
cerning the degree to which “money buys happiness” —meaning the extent to which consumption
of material goods, rather than leisure and related non-market activities, generates lasting in-
creases in wellbeing.
It is a common view that, in modern societies, people excessively value material consumptions
relative to “relational” ones such as family, friends, community service, etc. (e.g., Putnam
29Long and Ferrie (2005) indeed confirm that between 1850 and 1880 the United States was indeed much more
mobile than Great Britain (with occupational and geographical mobility going hand in hand) but that mobility
declined significantly after 1920, bringing to an end the reality of “American exceptionalism” with respect to
social mobility —though not its popular perceptions.
30As Alesina et al. (2001) write: “The electoral system may itself be endogenous to other variables, including
attitudes toward the poor... One may argue that in the United States the present system was chosen and
maintained precisely because it supported certain policy outcomes. Post-War France went back and forth from
more to less proportionality in part to suit the needs of various leaders”.
31For other parameter configurations it makes a laissez-faire equilibrium appear where initially only the welfare-
state one existed. It could also leave the equilibrium set and therefore beliefs unaffected, but this is an artefact
of the step functions. In the more general case of two continuous, upward-sloping curves with the same pattern
of intersections, beliefs will always respond in a way that amplifies the policy impact of the initial perturbation.
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[2000], Frank [2000]). Psychologists also point to phenomena such as the “hedonic treadmill”
and people’s general tendency to underestimate the speed at which their level of wellbeing will
revert to a baseline level following both favorable and unfavorable life events. [Gilbert et al.
1998; Kahneman, 2000]. While such “adaptation” has been found to operate on both changes in
material consumption (income, wealth, academic tenure) and relational ones (marriage, divorce,
etc.), the claim is often made that the failure of “affective forecasting” operates differentially,
leading to a bias toward material or status goods at the expense of relational ones or self-
development (e.g., Frey and Stutzer [2003]). Why it should be so, however, is typically not
explained; we provide here a simple motivated-beliefs theory of this phenomenon.32
Consider the same model as before, but replacing θ in the production function (1) by a
fixed, known return and letting uncertainty affect instead individual’s long-term utility from
consumption. Preferences at dates t = 0, 1 are thus (with β1 ≡ β < β0 ≡ 1 as before)
(25) U it ≡ E
"µ
θ
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¶£
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where θ is an imperfectly known preference parameter negatively related to the speed of hedonic
adaptation and P a known price deflator: terms of trade, index of product variety or quality,
etc. For simplicity, we abstract here from initial endowments: π0 = π1 = 0. This model is
clearly isomorphic to the previous one (with πi ≡ 0), so under conditions very similar to those
of Proposition 3 there are again two equilibria:
1. A consumerist and laissez-faire equilibrium: a large fraction of the population believes
that consumption is an important key to happiness. Consequently, they opt for high levels
of effort and vote for low redistribution, as they do not want their labor to subsidize the more
leisure-oriented pessimistic agents. Low redistribution, in turn, increases the incentives to believe
and teach to one’s offspring that the (now predictable) fruits of effort will translate into lasting
improvements in wellbeing.
2. A leisure-oriented and redistributive equilibrium: the mechanism works in reverse here,
with a majority or pivotal group holding more skeptical views about the value of “materialistic”
pursuits and opting instead for leisure, family and social life, etc. Individuals in such societies
work less both because of their different attitudes toward what makes one happy and because of
the (endogenously) higher taxes that they face.
Thus, along these more “cultural” dimensions as well, our model fits the major dichotomy
observed between the United States and Western European societies. Earlier comparative statics
results also carry over, so that Figure V now illustrates how a moderate increase in productivity
32Loewenstein, Rabin and O’Donoghue [2003] explore the implications of “projection bias” (consumers’ failure
to fully anticipate changes in their preferences) for several important issues such as the endowment effect, durable
goods purchases and addiction. On the other hand, the myopic forecasting rule followed by individuals in their
model is assumed a priori, and taken to apply equally to all sources of utility.
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or purchasing power X = 1/P, reflecting for instance opening to international trade, can trigger
a massive shift from “traditional values” (communal or village life, extended families, social
interactions, etc.) to a more atomistic (“bowling alone”) and mass-consumption society. On
the welfare side, materialistic beliefs are a mixed blessing, helping individuals to overcome their
tendency to underprovide effort but resulting in lower than expected levels of satisfaction.
B Beliefs and affect
We have so far stressed the value of beliefs in self-determination for the pursuit of long-term
goals. Another important motive discussed by psychologists (e.g., Lerner [1982]) is that people
derive comfort from thinking that they live in a just world. Many find the idea that personal
fate is largely random and beyond one’s control anxiety-provoking and the notion that it is
predetermined by social origins offensive.33 Such affective motives for just-world beliefs can
easily substitute for, or combine with, the functional one —they are in fact formally equivalent.
To see this, let agents’ utility at date t = 0, 1 be augmented as
(26) U it ≡ E
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with u0 > 0, meaning that people like to think that “effort pays,” having a high net return
(1− τ)θ. Such hedonic beliefs create again a complementarity between agents’ cognitive choices,
since: a) on the political side, the new term reinforces the tendency for an agent’s desired tax
rate τ i to decline with his belief µi, and hence for the equilibrium τ to decline with the fraction
of optimists, 1 − λ; b) on the cognitive side, it creates a new incentive to suppress bad news,
u((1−τ)θ(r))−u((1−τ)θL), which rises with 1−τ as long as u is not too concave. For instance,
if u(c) ≡ ρc2/2 then, for all λ < λ¯,
(27) −∂(U
i
0 |σ = L)
∂λ
= (1− τ)2r(∆θ)
µ
βaθL
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¶ ∙
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− β
¶µ
1 +
r∆θ
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¶¸
−m.
The hedonic parameter ρ thus plays essentially the same role, in the demand for just-world
beliefs, as the degree of intertemporal preference conflict 1− β (which could thus be zero).
VI Religion
The most common and powerful form of individually chosen but collectively sustained belief is
religion. A simple variant of the model allows us to analyze individual and cross-country differ-
33These tastes are well reflected in popular novels and movies, particularly the prototypical “Hollywood ending”.
For an insightful discussion of “the mind as a consuming organ”, including applications to literature and the arts,
see Schelling [1988]. Equation (26) below can also be seen as a reduced form for anticipal feelings of the type
studied by, e.g., Caplin and Leahy [2001], Landier [2000], Köszegi [2005] and Brunnermeier and Parker [2005].
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ences in a specific but economically important class of religious beliefs, namely those linked (or
similar) to the “Protestant ethic”. By this we refer to a belief that there is a hereafter in which
rewards and punishments are tied to effort and industriousness (or lack thereof) during one’s
lifetime.34 The alternative view is that there is no afterlife, or that if there is one, its rewards are
determined according to criteria unrelated to industriousness, or even antithetical to material
success: upholding vows of poverty and asceticism, good deeds toward others, scrupulous obser-
vance of rituals, contemplation, the “extinction of desires,” etc. Uncertainty over the existence
or nature of the next world can be simply modelled as follows:
a) In the production function, let θ be replaced by a fixed return, α ≥ 1. Thus, everyone
agrees on the nature of economic processes (rewards in the material world).
b) Preferences involve no time-inconsistency (β = 1) but include an anticipal term for the
“value of the afterlife,” u(e, θ), about which agents are uncertain.35
Without loss of generality let u(e, θ) = θe, where θH > θL are now the two possible (expected)
values of θ, conditional on σ = ∅, L.36 An agent’s preferences at t = 0, 1 are thus
(28) U it ≡ E
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where θ(µi) = µiθH+(1−µi)θL reflects the strength of his religious faith at t = 1. Note that the
policy variable 1 − τ no longer enters the anticipal term. Yet an endogenous complementarity
in belief formation will still arise, though now through a more subtle channel:
— The more religious an individual is, the harder he works and therefore the lower he wants
taxes to be, so as to avoid redistributing income toward less hard-working “unbelievers”. (By
contrast, µi no longer affects the tax-distortion concern, as α is common knowledge.) Thus, a
greater proportion of religious individuals leads (over the relevant range where the pivotal vote
switches) to a lower degree of redistribution.
— Conversely, the anticipation of a low tax rate increases the value of investing in (or trans-
mitting) religious beliefs. If a person expects to work hard because of low redistribution, then
34Such a link is consistent with both moral-hazard based and adverse-selection based doctrines. In the first case,
effort and industriousness are “good” behaviors that please and are encouraged by the divine power(s). In the
second, the ability to consistently engage in such virtuous conduct distinguishes the “chosen”, who were elected
for salvation, from the “reprobates”, who are irredeemably abandoned to sin and damnation. The insight that
Calvinistic beliefs in predestination generate a strong psychological desire to “self-diagnostic” which constitutes
a powerful work incentive is famously due to Max Weber. See Ainslie [1992] for a good discussion and Bodner
and Prelec [2002] and Bénabou and Tirole [2004] for formal models of self-signaling. For reviews of the literature
on religion and economics see Iannaconne [1998], Guiso et al. [2002] and Noland [2003].
35We set β = 1 for simplicity and to make clear that the mechanism explored here (as in the previous subsection)
does not require any intrapersonal or intergenerational conflict. Religion is also largely a self-discipline mechanism,
however, and this can be captured in our model by allowing β < 1. We leave this extension to future work.
36Among the negative signals (σ = L) that believers in a religion R may receive are scientific advances that
contradict traditional teachings, immoral conduct by religious officials, personal tragedies and injustices in the
world (wars, genocides, natural disasters) that challenge one’s faith, or the fact that believers in some other
religion R0 are more numerous or growing in numbers. In the polar specification with σ ∈ {G,∅}, positive signals
could include prayers “answered”, “miracles,” etc.
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believing that effort carries important rewards in the afterlife will generate high anticipatory
utility. If he expects to work little, on the other hand (because of high taxes or personal tastes)
then fervent religious beliefs are not very welfare-enhancing.
Therefore, under appropriate conditions, we can again expect two equilibria:
1. A high-religiosity / “Protestant work ethic” equilibrium, accompanied by high effort and
low redistribution.
2. An equilibrium characterized by a greater predominance of agnosticism or religions that
do not stress industriousness and worldly achievements, accompanied by the reverse pattern of
labor supply and redistributive policy.
We shall establish these results in the simple case where there are no ex-ante disparities in
endowments or social status among agents: π0 = π1 (more generally, π1−π0 is relatively small).
We also require a certain joint condition on the exogenous parameters of the model, given in
the Appendix (Assumption 5); it holds in particular when λ and λ¯ are close enough to 1/2.
Given the preferences (28), an agent with belief µi chooses effort ei = a
£
(1− τ)α+ θ(µi)
¤
and his expectation of aggregate output is y¯ = π¯ + a
£
(1− τ)α+Θ(µi)
¤
, where
Θ(µi) ≡ µiθ(r) + (1− µi) [λθL + (1− λ)θ(r)]
is his estimate of others’ average belief in the afterlife. The resulting expected utility from a tax
rate τ is then
(29) V (τ , µi) ≡ (a/2)
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(1− τ)α+ θ(µi)
¤2
+ aτ
£
(1− τ)α+Θ(µi)
¤
,
resulting in the preferred policy
(30) τ i ≡ min
½
Θ(µi)− θ(µi)
α
, 1
¾
.
Intuitively, believers expect to work hard and thus want regressive taxation (or, if that is ruled
out, τ i = 0), whereas nonbelievers favor progressive redistribution. In the no-information state
(σ = ∅), everyone shares the same beliefs and the tax rate is Topt(r) = −λr(1−r) (∆θ/α) (again,
nonnegative values could be ensured by introducing a public good). In the more interesting
informative state, σ = L, there are 1− λ believers with µi = r and λ non-believers with µi = 0;
so, once again, the tax rate jumps up when λ exceeds a critical threshold:
(31) τ =
(
Topt(r) ≡ −λr(1− r) (∆θ/α) < 0 if λ ≤ 2
Tpess(r) ≡ min {r(1− λ) (∆θ/α) , 1} > 0 λ > 1/2
.
Consider now individuals’ incentives to maintain and instill in their children strong religious
beliefs (of the type that we focus on). Given a signal σ = L, the difference in expected utility
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between a believer and a nonbeliever will be:
(32) V (τ , r)− V (τ , 0) = ar (∆θ) [(1− τ)α+ θL + r (∆θ/2) + τrλ] .
The important property to notice is that (since α ≥ 1) it is again increasing in 1 − τ , even
though taxes bear only on α, which is known, whereas religious beliefs are about θ.
Proposition 4 Let β = 1, π0 = π1 and let the productivity of effort be a fixed, known, α ≥ 1.
Assume also that Assumptions 1 and 5 hold. Then, for a range of values of m (and all m0 large
enough) there exist two politico-religious equilibria, such that:
1) In the informative state (σ = L), the fractions of believers are 1− λ and 1 − λ¯ and the tax
rates τ and τ¯ , given by (31). Redistribution is lower, average effort and output higher, in the
more religious equilibrium.
2) In the no-information state (σ = ∅), the rankings of tax rates, effort and output across the
two equilibria depend on parameters. If χ is low enough, in particular, there exist values of λ
and λ¯ such that these rankings remain the same as in the informed state.
Our model thus provides a simple theory of endogenous differences in religious beliefs, re-
solving in the process earlier discussions on whether religion can be brought within the scope
of the economics of information and of its relationship to cognitive dissonance or other forms
of belief adaptation [Montgomery 1996; Hardin 1997]. Furthermore, its predictions about the
main economic correlates of religiosity accord well with a considerable body of evidence:
— At the individual level, studies universally find that more religious individuals, particularly
Protestants, have less favorable attitudes toward redistribution than others and are more tolerant
of inequality [e.g., Alesina et al. 2001; Guiso et al., 2003, Scheve and Stasavage, 2005].
— At the cross-country level, Barro and McCleary [2003] find that a country’s degree of
religiosity —more specifically, the prevalence of beliefs in an afterlife characterized by heaven or
hell— is associated with faster growth, controlling for the usual determinants (see also Noland
[2003] for related results).
This simple model of religion could be enriched in a number of interesting directions. First,
one could explore channels of general-equilibrium feedback other than redistributive institutions,
which we have highlighted.37 Second, letting β < 1 would capture religion’s important role
as a self-discipline device. Third, one could allow for uncertainty over rewards both in this
37A natural one involves the informational spillovers that endogenously arise when agents’ signals σi are im-
perfectly correlated and they observe each others’s actions, as in the herding literature. Alternatively, in the
traditional (preference- rather than belief-based) literature on the economics of religion, it is often assumed that
religious participation involves network externalities. More recently, Scheve and Stasavage [2005] propose a model
of religion as a substitute for insurance, in which: a) religiosity confers psychic and/or material benefits that help
people buffer economic shocks (such as unemployment), thus offering an alternative explanation for why more
religious individuals desire less public redistribution; b) if these benefits increase with the number of religious
participants, multiple equilibria may arise.
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world and in the next (α and θ) and examine when the corresponding beliefs are substitutes or
complements.38 Indeed, many studies find a positive association between individuals’ religiosity
(particularly Protestantism) and their scores on BJW-type scales or their beliefs that success in
life can be achieved through hard work, that poverty is attributable to laziness, and that some
inequality is needed to provide incentives for effort [Peplau and Tyler, 1975; Guiso et al., 2003].
On the other hand, Scandinavians and Americans are both predominantly Protestant but, as
shown by Figure I, hold very different views on what determines people’s economic fate.
VII Conclusion
Is the “American Dream,” according to our theory, but a myth, a self-sustaining collective
illusion? The answer is more subtle than a simple yes or no. While the Belief in a Just World
equilibrium does (in the benchmark case) involve more overestimation of the extent to which
people ultimately get what they deserve, can go from rags to riches, etc., net incomes are (as
a result) truly more closely tied to merit than in a more redistributive “Realistic Pessimism”
equilibrium. Moreover, what really matters is not which set of beliefs is more accurate but
only that there be more optimism, or less pessimism, in the American than in the European
equilibrium. This endogenously shared ideology can also have important growth and efficiency
benefits, including improving people’s motivation to effort. Its net value to the poor is much
more ambiguous, since they receive less transfers and are more likely to be stigmatized.
More generally, our model provides a theory of collective beliefs, based on endogenous com-
plementarities between individuals’ cognitive choices that arise very naturally from the interplay
of well-established psychological motives and economic rationality. This simple blueprint is ap-
plicable to a wide domain of beliefs and biases, such as pro- or anti-redistributive ideology,
consumerist versus leisurist views on happiness, and even religion, all of which were examined
here. Many others interesting ones, such as organized propaganda, seem within the reach of
further research.
38Our model already suggests channels for both mechanisms. On one hand, if an individual expects to work
hard because he thinks that the economic return is high, he has a greater incentive to believe that effort will also
be rewarded in the next world. On the other hand, if he anticipates working hard for religious reasons he may
have (when β < 1) less self-motivational need to engage in positive thinking about the economic return to effort.
These two effects could produce a correlation of either sign between ideological and religious beliefs, depending
on whether the opportunity costs of religiosity or the need for motivation varied most. The general-equilibrium
effect of redistribution on belief formation, finally, will always tend to induce a positive correlation.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Let us first make explicit the values of the function Γ(µi) for the
two posteriors that agent will hold in equilibrium. When σˆi = L, we have Γ(0) = θ2L + (1 −
λ)θL(θ(r)− θL) > θ2L. When σˆi = ∅, we have
Γ(r) = rθHθ(r) + (1− r)θL(λθL + (1− λ)θ(r))
= θ(r)2 − λ(1− r)θL [θ(r)− θL] < θ(r)2.(A.1)
1) Proof of concavity: we have
∂2V i
∂τ2
= aβ
£
(2− β/γ) θ(µi)2 − 2Γ(µi)
¤
,
so the function V i is concave in τ if (2− β/γ) θ(µi)2 < 2Γ(µi), meaning that:
(2− β/γ)
¡
µiθH + (1− µi)θL
¢2
< 2
£
µiθHθ(r) + (1− µi)θL (λθL + (1− λ)θ(r))
¤
.
Since the difference between the left- and right-hand sides is quadratic and convex in µi, it only
needs to be checked at the boundaries of the range of beliefs [0, r] achievable in equilibrium. For
µi = 0 we get (2− β/γ) (θL)2 < 2θL [λθL + (1− λ)θ(r)] , which trivially holds. For µi = r, we
require that:
(2− β/γ) θ(r)2 ≤ 2 [rθHθ(r) + (1− r)θL(λθL + (1− λ)θ(r))]
= 2 [(rθH + (1− r)θL) θ(r)− (1− r)λθL(θ(r)− θL)]
= 2
£
θ(r)2 − (1− r)λθL(θ(r)− θL)
¤
⇐⇒
(β/γ) θ(r)2 ≥ 2r(1− r)λθL(θH − θL).
Since r(1− r) ≤ 1/4, this is ensured by Assumption 2(i). k
We now rank agents’ preferred tax rates, as functions of their endowments and beliefs.
2) Proof that Topt(π0) < Tpess(π0) : By (11), for any π we have Topt(π) < Tpess(π) if and only if:
(A.2)
π − π¯ + aβΓ(0)
aβ [2Γ(0)− (2− β/γ) θ(0)2] <
π − π¯ + aβΓ(r)
aβ [2Γ(r)− (2− β/γ) θ(r)2] ,
which is equivalent to:
(A.3)µ
π¯ − π
aβ
¶ ∙µ
2− β
γ
¶
(θ(r)2 − θ2L)− 2 (Γ(r)− Γ(0))
¸
<
µ
2− β
γ
¶£
θ(r)2Γ(0)− θ(0)2Γ(r)
¤
.
Now, note that:
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Γ(r)− Γ(0) = θ(r)2 − θ2L − λ(1− r)θL(θ(r)− θL)− (1− λ)θL(θ(r)− θL)
= r (∆θ) [θ(r) + θL − (1− λr)θL] = r (∆θ) [(1 + λr)θL + r (∆θ)](A.4)
and that:
θ(r)2Γ(0)− θ(0)2Γ(r) = θLθ(r)2 [θL + (1− λ)(θ(r)− θL)]− θ2L
£
θ(r)2 − λ(1− r)θL (θ(r)− θL)
¤
= θL(θ(r)− θL)
£
(1− λ)θ(r)2 + λ(1− r)θ2L
¤
.
= rθL (∆θ)
£
(1− λ)θ(r)2 + λ(1− r)θ2L
¤
.(A.5)
which implies in particular that θ(r)2/Γ(r) > θ(0)2/Γ(0). Thus, condition (A.3) takes the form:µ
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If the term in brackets on the right-hand side is negative —this always occurs, in particular,
when γ = β, the condition automatically holds for the poor, since π¯−π0 > 0. Assume therefore
that the said term in brackets is positive. Since (π¯ − π0) /aβ < θ2L by Assumption 2(ii) and
θ(r) ≥ θL, a sufficient condition for (A.6) to hold with π = π0 isµ
2− β
γ
¶
θL(1− λr)− 2
µ
1− λr − β
γ
¶
θL +
µ
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γ
¶
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γ
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¶
r∆θ > 0 ⇐⇒ θL (1 + λr) + r∆θ > 0,
hence the result. k
3) Proof that Tpess(π0) < 1 : by (11), this is equivalent to
π¯ − π0
βa
< Γ(0) = θL [(1− λ)θ(r) + λθL] ,
for which it is sufficient that π¯ − π0 < βaθ2L, which is ensured by Assumption 2(ii). k
4) Proof that Topt(π1) < 0 : by (11), this is equivalent to:
π1 − π¯
aβ
> Γ(r)− (2− β/γ) θ(r)2 = Γ(r)− θ(r)2 − (1− β/γ) θ(r)2,
which holds automatically since θ(r)2 > Γ(r) by (A.1). k
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5) Proof that Tpess(π0) > 0, when (π¯ − π0)/aβ > (1− β/γ)θ2L. 1. By (11), Tpess(π0) > 0 if
π0 − π¯
aβ
+ Γ(0) < 2Γ(0)− (2− β/γ) θ(0)2 ⇐⇒
π¯ − π0
aβ
> θL [(2− β/γ) θL − (θL + (1− λ)r (∆θ))] ⇐⇒
π¯ − π0
aβ
> θL [(1− β/γ) θL − (1− λ)r (∆θ)] ,
hence the result. k
6) Proof that agents i’s preferred tax rate is Tpess(πi) or Topt(πi), depending on σˆi = L,∅ :
by concavity of V i, we have τ i = min
©
T (πi, µi), 1
ª
.(If τ was constrained to be nonnegative,
we would have instead τ i = max
©
min
©
T (π, µi), 1
ª
, 0
ª
; this would make little difference to
the results). Furthermore, we have established that: Topt(π1) ≤ Topt(π0) < Tpess(π0) < 1 and
Tpess(π1) ≤ Tpess(π0),where the inequalities are strict whenever π0 < π1. Thus Tpess(π0) is the
largest desired tax rate and the constraint τ i ≤ 1 is never binding in equilibrium. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2 . We can write
τ¯ − τ ≡ Tpess(π0 |λ¯, r¯)− Topt(π0 |λ, r)
=
π0 − π¯ + aβΓ(r |λ, r)
aβ [2Γ(r |λ, r)− (2− β/γ) θ(r)2] −
π0 − π¯ + aβΓ(0 |λ¯, r¯)
aβ
£
2Γ(0 |λ¯, r¯)− (2− β/γ) θ(0)2¤
= Π1 +
µ
π¯ − π0
aβ
¶
Π2,
where
Π1 ≡
1
2− (2− β/γ) θ(r)2/Γ(r |λ, r) −
1
2− (2− β/γ) θ(0)2/Γ(0 |λ¯, r¯) ,(A.7)
Π2 ≡
1
2Γ(0 |λ¯, r¯)− (2− β/γ) θ(0)2 −
1
2Γ(r |λ, r)− (2− β/γ) θ(r)2 .(A.8)
We now show that Π1 > 0 and, under Assumption 3(ii), Π2 > 0 . First, Π1 > 0 if and only if
θ(r)2Γ(0 |λ¯, r¯) > θ(0)2Γ(r |λ, r) ⇐⇒
θ(r)2Γ(0 |λ, r)− θ(0)2Γ(r |λ, r) > θ(r)2 £Γ(0 |λ, r)− Γ(0 |λ¯, r¯)¤ .
By (A.5) and (9), this is equivalent to:
rθL (∆θ)
£
(1− λ)θ(r)2 + λ(1− r)θ2L
¤
> θ(r)2θL
£
λθL + (1− λ)θ(r)− λ¯θL − (1− λ¯)θ(r¯)
¤
⇐⇒
r
£
(1− λ)θ(r)2 + λ(1− r)θ2L
¤
> θ(r)2
£
(1− λ)r − (1− λ¯)r¯
¤
,
or, equivalently, r λ(1− r)θ2L+(1− λ¯)r¯θ(r)2 > 0, proving that Proposition 2 always holds when
π0 = π¯ = π1. Next, Π2 > 0 if and only if
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2
£
Γ(r |λ, r)− Γ(0 |λ¯, r¯)¤ > (2− β/γ) [θ(r)2 − θ(0)2] ⇐⇒
2
£
Γ(0 |λ, r)− Γ(0 |λ¯, r¯)¤+2 £Γ(r |λ, r)− Γ(0 |λ, r)− ¡θ(r)2 − θ(0)2¢¤+(β/γ) [θ(r)2− θ(0)2] > 0.
Using (9) to compute the first term and the the first line of (A.4) for the second one, this becomes
2θL (∆θ)
£
(1− λ)r − (1− λ¯)r¯
¤
− 2 [λ(1− r) + 1− λ] θL(θ(r)− θL) + (β/γ) [θ(r)2 − θ(0)2] > 0,
or:
2θL (∆θ)
©
r [λ(1− r) + 1− λ]− (1− λ)r + (1− λ¯)r¯
ª
< (β/γ) [θ(r)2 − θ(0)2] ⇐⇒
2θL (∆θ)
£
λ r(1− r) + (1− λ¯)r¯
¤
< (β/γ) r (∆θ) [2θL + r (∆θ)].
We can rewrite this as
(A.9)
β
γ
>
λ r(1− r) + (1− λ¯)r¯
r[1 + r (∆θ) / (2θL)]
=
r(1− λr)
r[1 + r (∆θ) / (2θL)]
+
r¯(1− λ¯)− r (1− λ)
r[1 + r (∆θ) / (2θL)]
.
From (17) we see that r(1 − λ) is increasing in 1 − λ, hence the last term in (A.9) is negative
and the inequality therefore holds under Assumption 3(ii). ¥
Proof of Proposition 3. In addition to Assumptions 2—3, the proposition requires
Assumption 4 Denoting r˜ ≡ r if λ¯ = 1 and r˜ ≡ r¯ if λ¯ < 1, letµ
∆θ
2θL
¶
r˜ <
1− β
β
<
µ
∆θ
2θL
¶
(r + r¯) .
We now proceed to show the claimed results.
1. Informative state (σ = L). Let us examine the incentive to repress (gross of memory costs):
U˜L(τ , r)− U˜L(τ , 0) = aβ(1− τ)2θL (θ(r)− θL)− aβ2(1− τ)2
µ
θ(r)2 − θ2L
2
¶
= aβ(1− τ)2 (θH − θL) r
∙
(1− β)θL − βr
µ
∆θ
2
¶¸
.(A.10)
The required equilibrium conditions are therefore that:
βr
µ
∆θ
2
¶
< (1− β)θL,(A.11)
(1− τ¯)2r¯
∙
(1− β)θL − βr¯
µ
∆θ
2
¶¸
< (1− τ)2r
∙
(1− β)θL − βr
µ
∆θ
2
¶¸
.(A.12)
Since (1− τ¯)2 < (1− τ)2, the second one is satisfied when
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(1− β)θL (r¯ − r) < β (∆θ)
µ
r¯2 − r2
2
¶
⇐⇒ (1− β)θL < β∆θ
µ
r¯ + r
2
¶
.
Thus, the two requirements jointly take the following form:
(A.13)
µ
∆θ
2θL
¶
r <
1− β
β
<
µ
∆θ
2θL
¶
(r¯ + r) ,
which is ensured by Assumption 4 since r ≤ r˜. Finally, when λ¯ < 1 we also need to check that
no agent want to rehearse bad news: U˜L(τ¯ , r¯)− U˜L(τ¯ , 0) > −m0. This condition is satisfied when
m0 is large enough, and even for all m0 > 0 provided that
(A.14) r¯
µ
∆θ
2
¶
<
µ
1− β
β
¶
θL,
which is ensured by Assumption 4, since r˜ ≡ r¯ when λ¯ < 1. This establishes the existence of the
two equilibria. Consider now aggregate output. In an equilibrium (λ, r),
(A.15) y¯L = π¯ + aβθL(1− τ) [θL + r(1− λ) (∆θ)] .
Since τ < τ¯ and (1− λ)r > (1− λ¯)r¯ by (17), y¯L is always higher in the BJW equilibrium.
2. Uninformative state (σ = ∅). Recall that we focus here on the case where π1 = π0 and χ is
small (more generally, π1 − π0 << χ << 1). As χ ≈ 0,
(A.16) r =
q
q + χ(1− q)(1− λ) ≈ 1− χ(1− λ)
µ
1− q
q
¶
,
so by (A.1)
Γ(r)/θ(r)2 = 1− λ(1− r) [θ(r)− θL]
µ
θL
θ(r)2
¶
= 1− λr(1− r)
µ
θL∆θ
θ(r)2
¶
≈ 1 + χλ(1− λ)
µ
1− q
q
¶µ
θL∆θ
θ2H
¶
≡ 1 + χλ(1− λ)ξ,
where the last equality defines the parameter ξ. Therefore, given π1 = π0,
1− Topt(π0) =
1
2− (2− β/γ) θ(r)2/Γ(r) ≈
µ
γ
β
¶
[1 + (2γ/β − 1)χλ(1− λ)ξ] .
Therefore, we have Topt(π0 |λ, r) < Topt(π0 |λ¯, r¯) if and only if λ¯(1 − λ¯) < λ(1 − λ),which is
compatible with the other assumptions listed Proposition 3. Turning now to aggregate output,
in an equilibrium (λ, r) it is given by
y¯∅ − π¯
aβθH
= (1− τ) [θL + r (∆θ)] = [1− Topt(π0)] [θL + r (∆θ)]
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≈
µ
γ
β
¶ ∙
1 +
µ
2γ
β
− 1
¶
χλ(1− λ)ξ
¸
θH
∙
1− χ(1− λ)
µ
1− q
q
¶µ
∆θ
θH
¶¸
≈
µ
γθH
β
¶
+ χ
µ
γθH
β
¶ ∙µ
2γ
β
− 1
¶
λ(1− λ)ξ − (1− λ)
µ
1− q
q
¶µ
∆θ
θH
¶¸
=
µ
γθH
β
¶
+ χ
µ
γθH
β
¶µ
1− q
q
¶µ
∆θ
θH
¶
(1− λ)
∙µ
2γ
β
− 1
¶µ
θL
θH
¶
λ− 1
¸
Therefore, we have y¯∅(λ, r) > y¯∅(λ¯, r¯) if and only if
(1− λ)
∙µ
2γ
β
− 1
¶µ
θL
θH
¶
λ− 1
¸
− (1− λ¯)
∙µ
2γ
β
− 1
¶µ
θL
θH
¶
λ¯− 1
¸
= (λ¯− λ)
∙µ
2γ
β
− 1
¶µ
θL
θH
¶¡
λ¯+ λ− 1
¢
− 1
¸
> 0,
or, finally
(A.17)
µ
2γ
β
− 1
¶µ
θL
θH
¶¡
λ¯+ λ− 1
¢
> 1,
which again is compatible with the other assumptions, provided we are in the case γ = 1 and β
is low enough. In particular, it must be below 2/3. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4 . As usual, let r and r¯ denote the optimistic posterior beliefs associated
to awareness rates λ and λ¯ respectively. We shall require that
Assumption 5 Let (i) λ < 1/2 < λ¯ ≤ 1 and (ii) assume that
(A.18)
r¯2
¡
1− λ¯r¯/α
¢
min
©
1− λ¯, α/(r¯∆θ)
ª
+ r2 (1− λr/α) (1− r)λ
r¯ − r >
α+ θL
∆θ
+
r¯ + r
2
.
Note that when λ and λ¯ tend toward 1/2− and 1/2+ respectively r and r¯ tend to a common
limit r∗(1/2;χ), so the left-hand side tends toward +∞ while the right-hand side remains finite,
implying that condition is automatically satisfied.
We now prove the proposition. The low-recall equilibrium (λ = λ, τ = τ) exists if and only if
m < V (τ , r)− V (τ , 0) = ar (∆θ) [(1− τ)α+ θL + r (∆θ) /2 + τ r λ] , where
τ = Topt(r) = −λr(1− r) (∆θ) /α
Similarly, the high-recall equilibrium (λ = λ¯, τ = τ¯) exists if and only if
m > V (τ , r¯)− V (τ , 0) = ar¯ (∆θ)
£
(1− τ¯)α+ θL + r¯ (∆θ) /2 + τ¯ r¯ λ¯
¤
> −m0, where
τ¯ = Tpess(r¯) = min
©
r¯(1− λ¯) (∆θ) /α, 1
ª
.
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The necessary and sufficient conditions for multiplicity are therefore that
(A.19) r¯
£
(1− τ¯)α+ θL + r¯ (∆θ) /2 + τ¯ r¯λ¯
¤
< r [(1− τ)α+ θL + r (∆θ) /2 + τ r λ] ,
and that m0 be large enough. The above condition can be rewritten as
(r¯ − r) [α+ θL + (∆θ) (r¯ + r) /2] < r¯ τ¯
¡
α− λ¯r¯
¢
− r τ (α− λr) .
Substituting in τ¯ and τ yields the result, by Assumption 5(ii). Next, note that output in state
σ = L equals
y¯L = π¯ + a [(1− τ)α+ θL + (1− λ)r(∆θ)] .
Since τ < τ¯ and (1− λ)r > (1− λ¯)r¯ by (17), y¯L is higher in the more religious equilibrium.
Consider now the no-information state, in which agents’ uniformly shared beliefs are θ(r)
and θ(r¯) respectively, with θ(r) < θ(r¯), while taxes are Topt(r) and Topt(r¯). Since Topt(r) =
−λr(1 − r) (∆θ) /α, (A.16) implies that when χ is small taxes in state σ = ∅ are also lower
under the more religious equilibrium if λ¯(1− λ¯) < λ(1− λ). Note that this is compatible with
the other assumptions in Proposition 4; in particular, Assumption 5 is automatically satisfied
when χ is small enough, as both r¯ and r tend to 1. Turning finally to output, it equals
(A.20) y¯∅ = π¯ + a [(1− τ)α+ θL + r(∆θ)] ,
so it is higher in the (λ, λ¯) equilibrium if and only if (r¯ − r)(∆θ/α) < Topt(r¯) − Topt(r) =
[r¯ (1− r¯)− r (1− r)] (∆θ/α), or r¯+ r > 2, which is also satisfied when χ is close enough to 0. ¥
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